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The recent  attempts  to move the eocialist  economies  (SEs)  away from a
system  where  major  decision  are  made  on the  basis  of quantity  signals,  command
rules  and  state  ownership  to a system  where  relative  prices  and  decentralized
markets  play the  major role in economic  decision-making  poses  some important
questions  for  macroeconomic  management.  What  are  the  initial  rules  of  behavior
of the  firm,  government  and  household  sector  when  these  economies  enter  into  the
reform  process?  What are  the  major  macro imbalances  faced  by the SE at the
beginning  of the  reform  process?  What  instruments  of  macroeconomic  control  are
available in these economies?  What are the potential conflicts  between
stabilization  and  reform? How  is it  possible  to cnaracterize  inflation  in
SE --  a phenomenon  that  now  affects  several  socialist  economies?  What  are  the
determinants  of growth  in SE?  These  are some  of the  major  questions  involved
in the  topic  at hand.
Unstable  macroeconomic  conditions  tend  to  undermine  the  reform  process  in
several  ways.  A primary  goal  of the  reform  process  is to give  relative  prices
a major  role in  economic  decisions. Hign and  erratic  inflation  rates  however
reduce  the informational  content  of relative  prices.  Unsustainable  current
account  deficits  may reduce  the  future  access  to foreign  borrowing  thus  making
adjustment  more costly  in the  medium  term.  Large fiscal  deficits  tend to be
inflationary  and often lead to the postponement  of structural  reforms.  In
general,  those macro imbalances  increase  the probability  of future policy
reversals  as domestic  agents  and foreign  creditors  start  to cast  doubts  on the
sustainability of the reform  process.  Slow growth,  in turn,  undermines  the
prospects  for  successful  economic  transformation  in  SE.
This  paper  seeks  to  provide  a  simple  analytical  framework  for  examining
problems  of  macroeconomic  adjustment,  stabilization  and  growth  in socialist2
economies  undergoing  a  process  of reform.
In  Section  2, asing  a simple  macro  model  as a  benchmark  for  the "classic*
socialist  economy  entering  a reform  process,  we try  to identify  the  nature  of
major macro imbalances  in the goods,  labor  and foreign  exchange  markets  and
describe the underlying rules of behavior of households,  firms and  the
government.  We then  discuss  the  scope  for  policies  that  attempt  to  modify  the
real  exchange  rate,  real  wage and  aggregate  demand. The  role  of  microeconomic
reforms  and  changes  in rules  of  government  behavior  are  also  discussed.
The  issue  of  the  money  overhang,  defined  as  a  process  of  accumulation  of
money balances by  the public reflecting  the difference  between intended
expenditure  and  actual  purchases  is  examined.  Alternative  measures  designed  to
eliminate the accumulated  money overhang such as currency reform, price
deregulation,  financial  deepening  and auctions  of public sector  assets  are
discussed.  The  impact  of  eliminating  fiscal  deficits  and  structural  reforms  on
the  money  overhang  is  also  explored.
In Section  3, the inflationary  trends  in Eastern  Europe  and the Soviet
Union  are  reviewed,  and  a  simple  model  of  the  inflationary  process  is  developed.
The  model  encompasses  expectations,  inertia,  the  interaction  of  adverse  external
shocks,  devaluation  and the  financing  of loss-making  public  enterprises. An
extension  for  the  case  of  hyperinflation  is  carried  out  in order  to illuminate
some  key features  of the  inflation  process  in  quasi-hyperinflationary  socialist
economies.  Some  policy  implications  for  stabilization  in  SE  are  also  discussed.
In Section  4, after  briefly  reviewing  the empirical  record  of growth,
investment  and  technical  progress  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  in  the
past three  decades  we take  up the issue  of growth  in  a socialist  economy  from
three  different  perspectives:  the  supply  side,  the  savings  availability  and  the3
invemtment  response.  From  the  perspective  of  the  supply  side,  we try  to  explain
the coexistence  of relatively  modest  GDP growth  with high rates  of capital
accumulation  - a trend  observed  since  the  mid-seventies  in several  socialist
economies. In addition,  the issue  of extremely  low (even  negative)  recorded
rates of technical  progress in those economies is addressed.  From the
perspective  of the saving  availability,  the  lack  of foreign  savings  needed  to
import  capital  and  modern  technology,  and  the  difficulty  of  mobilizing  domestic
savings  into  productive  investment  is discussed  in the context  of a two gap
model  with fix  prices  and  non-shiftable  capital  and  in  the  context  of  a simple
growth  model  with price flexibility  and  malleable  capital. Lastly,  from the
investment perspective, credibility problems  associated with  systemic
uncertainty  concerning  the  final  fate  of the  reform  process  are  singled  out  as
additional  constraints  to growth  in reforming  socialist  economies.  The  paper
concludes  in  Section  5.
2.  A  simple benchmark  model for analyzing  macroeconomic  adjustment  in
reforming  socialist  economies
In this  section  we develop  a simple  macro  model incorporating  aggregate
demand,  aggregate  supply,  the  labor  market,  the  money  market  and  the  balance  of
payments. This  aggregate  macro  model,  though  perhaps  a better  descriptive  of
a  market  economy,  is still  useful  az a  benchmark  from  which  we can  compare  some
actual  features  of  macro  behavior  in traditional  socialist  economies,  such  as,
the  existence  of disequilibrium  in the  goods  and  labor  market,  the  problem  of
money overhang,  labor hoarding,  and the soft budget  constraints  of firms.
Moreover, a market economy  seems to be the system  that reforming  SEs are4
approaching.
Let  us  turn  to  the  benchmark  model. Aggregate  demand  in  the  goods  market,
Yd, is  made a function  of the  stock  of real  balances,  MIP, a vector  of fiscal
variables,  2, including  real  public  spending  and  taxes,  the  real  exchange  rate
affecting  transactions  with the  convertible  currency  area,  EP*/P  and  the  level
of income  of the  trade  partners,Y*.  A shift  factor,  q,  is introduced  to  reflect
demand  shocks.
(1)  ydfMP,  Z,EP/P,  Y*,  q)
Aggregate supply,  YS  ,  is  made an inverse function  of the real  wage ,W/P,
the real price of imported  inputs, equal to the real exchange rate for
simplicity,  EP*/P,  and  a factor  u reflecting  the  effects  of supply  shocks.
(2)  y8 * g(  W/P,  EP*  P,  U)
Equation  (2)  implicitly  assumes  profit  maximization  by  firms  (or  at least
cost-minimization);  again  though  this  may not describe  the  objective  function
of the  traditional  socialist  firm (see  chart  1.),  the  reformed  firm sector  is
intended  to  start  behaving  as  such. The  characterization  of  equilibrium  between
aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  will  depend  on  whether  prices  (and  wages)
are  flexible  or not,  say
min  [y d ys]  when  prices  are  fixed [3  y8  Yd  with flexible  pricesTurning to the labor market, the underlying  demand for labor function
associated  with (2)  is given  bys
(U)  Ld . h(W/P,  EP*  /P)
Labor  market  equilibrium  (at  full  employment)  is  given  by
(5)  LI  - Ld [(W/P)e,EP*/P]
where Ls is the exogenous  labor supply  in the economy and (W/P)e  is the
equilibrium  level  of real  wages.
In  most  socialist economies the  government  pursues a  policy of
guaranteeing  full'  employment  in  the  economy  more  as  an  administrative  practice
rather  than  as the  outcome  of profit  maximization  by firms. In practice  this
policy  usually  leads  labor  employment  belond  its  optimal  level  where  W/P  -
5YJUL. The  difference  between  the  optimal  employment  level  (namely  that  arising
from  equating  real  wages  with the  marginal  product  of labor)  and the  observed
employment  level,  will  be termed  as  redundant  labor  . Another  reason  to  observe
'redundant'  labor is the practice - widely recognized  in the traditionai
socialist  firm  - of  hoarding  labor  as  a  cushion  to  prevent  unfulfillment  of  the
physical  production  targets  of the  plan because  of shortage  of labor (for  a
formal model of a  socialist firm factor demand and output supply under
uncertainty,  a  soft  budget  constraint,  and the availability  of bailouts  see
Goldfeld  and  Quandt,  1988;  see  also  Kornai,  1982).6
The  balance  of payments  in the  economy,  B, is  written  as the sum  of the
trade  balance  with  the  convertible  currency  aria,  TB,  the  trade  balance  with  the
non-convertible  currency  area,  TBnc,  interest  and  factor  payments  abroad,  r*D*
and  the  net  flow  of  capital  from  abroad,  F.
The only endogenous  component  of the balance  of payments  is the trade
balance  with  the  convertible  currency  area.  It  will  be assumed  that  TB  depend
on the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  levels  of domestic  and  foreign  income  (of  the
countries  in the  convertible  currency  area).
(6)  TB=  TBV  EP*/P,Y,Y*)
Therefore  the  balance  of  payments  will  be equal  to
(7)  Br TB(  EP*/P,Y,Y*)  + TBnc  +  rD  +  F
It  becomes  clear  from  inspection  of equation  (6)  that  the lower  the size
of  the  trade  with  the  convertible  currency  area,  the  less  the  impact  of  changes
in the real  exchange  rate - depreciation  or overvaluation-  on the  balance  of
payments.
Figure  1  shows  the  equilibrium  of  the  system.  In  quadrant  (a)  the  upward
sloping  schedule  BB in (EP*/P,  Y) space  represents  the  balance  of  payments,  the
downward  sloping  schedule  YsY8  is  the  aggregate  supply  function  and  its  negative
slope  reflects  the  adverse  effect  on  the  supply  of  output  of an increase  in  the
real  exchange  rate  resulting  from  the  increase  in  the  relative  price  of imported
inputs,  a complementary  factor  to labor  in production.  The upward  sloping
schedule yd  is the  aggregate  demand  schedule  reflecting  substitution  away  from7
foreign  goods  when  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates.  In  Figure  1,  at  the  real
exchange  rate (eR)A  there  is both  an excess  demand  for  goods  and  a balance  of
payments  deficit.  Clearly  at  the  level  of  output  YA  a  combination  of  expenditure
switching  - a  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  --  and  expenditure  reducing
policies  are required  (to  shift  the  YdYd schedule  up to the left  in order  to
intersect  the other two schedules  at E).  Quadrant  (b) depicts  an inverse
relationship  -obtained  from  equation  (2)-  between  real  wages,  W/P and  the  real
exchange  rate,  EP*/P. This  relation  is  independent  of the  level  of  output  under
the  assumption  of  constant  returns  to  scale. Quadrant  (c),  in  turn,  depicts  the
labor  market  where the downward  sloping  schedule  is the notional  demand  for
labor,  equation (5), and the vertical  line is the exogenous  labor supply
function.  Furthermore,  at the 'excessive'  level of real wages, (wR)A --
associated  with  an overvalued  real  exchange  rate  (eR)A  --  there  is  unemployment
in  the  labor  market,  the  latter  being  of  a  classic  nature  (real  wage  higher  than
marginal product of  labor at  full employment).  In  the  terminology  of
disequilibrium  theory (Benassy,1982)  the economy  would be in a  regime  of
'classic  unemployment",  combining  excess  demand  in the  goods  market  and  excess
supply  in the labor  market (for  two different  views on how to characterize
macroeconomic  equilibrium  in  a socialist  economy,  see  Kornai,  1982,  and  Portes,
1986).  However,  the important  point  here is to recognize  that at (WR)A  the
labor  market  would  be in  a state  of excess  supply  (employment  being  at  LA  <  Ls)
if  firms  were  profit  maximizing  units.
Nevertheless,  in  a  traditional  socialist ionomy  one  is  likely  to  observe
an state  of excess  demand  for  labor  at  the  real  wage (wR)A provided  the  demand
for  labor  tends  to depart  from  profit  maximization  in favor  of labor  hoarding
and/or  overemployment.8
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The  nature  of  the  disequilibrium  in  the  goods  and  labor  markets  discussed
above  may  shed  some  light  on  the  problem  of 'forced"  savings  and  money  overhang.
The  argument  can  be illustrated  by  Quadrant  tc)  in  Figure  1a  the  L - LA units
of labor  which are paid at a real  wage higher  than the marginal  product  of
labor.  MPL,  contribute  to output  by
MPL  x (L  - LA)
but  those  workers  receive  a level  of real  income  given  by
(wR)  x (L  - LA)
since (wR)A >  MPL, there is going to be an extra income unmatched  by a
corresponding  increase  in output (imports  are assumed to be restricted)'.
Therefore,  when the  workers  who receive  this  kind  of 'labor  rent'  try  to spent
the  extra  income  in the  goods  market,  the  results  will be an excess  demand  at
the ongoing  f_.z  prices.  Therefore,  forced  savings  arises  as the result  of
purchasing  power  unable  to be spent  in the  goods  market  rationed  by supply. 2
In terms of financial  assets,  the forced  savings  mechanism  associated  with
frustrated  consumption  decisions  takes  the form  of  hoarding  of  money  balances
leading  to a situation  of money  overhang  as labeled  in literature. The fact
that domestic  money is the 'only'  asset available  for accumulation  by the
private  sector  is  a  consequence  that  in  a  traditional  socialist  economy  physical
capital  accumulation  --  machinery,  equipment,  housing  and land  is,  in  general,
carried  out  by the  state. In turn,  financial  intermediation  conducted  through
the  public  banking  system  is  reduced  to  deposit  accounts  and  credit  operations
with state-owned  enterprises.  Moreover,  the possibility  of hoarding  durable
goods  is  prevented  by the  fact  that  the  markets  for  those  goods  are,  in  general,
rationed  by supply.10
chart  1
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The problem  of the money overhang  may be of less importance  once the
existence  of black markets for foreign  exchange  and other assets  or goods
becomes  officially  tolerated,  hence reducing  the costs  of engaging  in those
portfolio activities.  On the other hand, highly inflationary  socialist
economies  like  Poland  or Yugoslavia,  with a tendency  toward  dollarization  as
reflected  in the widespread  emergence  of dollar denominated  assets in the
banking  system,  may  have  jumped  from  a  money  overhang  situation,  to  a state  of
demonetization  as real  balances  started  to  be heavily  taxed  by inflation.
The previous  analysis  suggest  that the traditional  socialist  economy
exhibits  at least  the following  short run  macroeconomic  disequilibrium  (the
issue  of inflation  and  fiscal  deficits  will be  dealt  with in  Section  3).
- excess  demand  in the  goods  market
- money-overhang  and  forced  savings
- misalignments  between  real  wages and  labor  productivity  resulting
in labor  redundancy
How to "restore macroeconomic  equilibrium? In the classic  centrally
planned  economy,  the  standard  tools  of  macroeconomic  management  that  rely  on  the
price  mechanisms  have  a limited  role  in  the  determination  of  macro  equilibrium.
In particular,  monetary  policy is reduced  to setting  the stock of credit
available  to the  firms,  government  and  household  sectors. Interest  rates  play
no role  as transmission  mechanism  of monetary  policy  in economies  where  bonds
markets  and  commercial  lending  are  practically  absent. In  turn,  exchange  rate
policy (accompanied  with the corresponding  expenditure  reducing  policies)
oriented  to realign  the real exchange  rate and real  wages  will have little
impact  on the system  if the trade sector  is regulated  through  exports  and
imports  quotas  and  labor  hiring  is  not  governed  by considerations  linking  real12
wages  with  labor  productivity.
At this  point,  structural  reforms  and  macroeconomic  policies  need to  be
closely  interconnected.  In fact,  the  transition  from  a central  planned  to a
market-oriented  economy  will change  the  way macroeconomic  policies  are to be
conducted. In  particular  as relative  prices  - included  the  real  interest  rate
as an intertemporal  relative  price  - start  to  play  a  key  role  in  the  resource
allocation  process,  the standard  tools of macro management  like monetary,
exchange  rate  and  wage policy  may become  effective  instruments. In practice,
for this to happen,  both changes  in market structure  and in the rules  of
behavior  of the firms sector  at microeconomic  level  are required. Markets
should  become  more  competitive,  for  example,  through  the  opening  of  the  economy
to foreign  trade.  The individual  firms,  in turn,  should  behave  as profit
mazimization  units  (or at  least cost minimizing  ones) and  their budget
constraint  must turn binding or 'hard"  using  Kornai  (1980,  1982)  terminology.
The  basic  idea  would  be  to  replicate  a  competitive  equilibrium  where  firms
are price  takers  and the  property  structure  of firms  ie such  that incentives
mechanisms  actually  work. 3 In  this  context,  market  survival  requires  efficient
(i.e profit  maximization)  firm behavior.  Of course in such circumstances
relative  prices  will play a key role in output supply  and factor demand
decisions  by firms.
On the contrary,  if firms  keep their  standard  behavior  of a centrally
planned  economy,  namely  meeting  quantity  production  targets  and  employing  labor
on different  criteria  from the equalization  of real  wages  with the  marginal
productivity of  labor  -either because of  labor  hoarding  or  because
administrative  practice  directed  to fulfill  the socialist  goal of providing
every  one  a job-a  policy  package  oriented  to expenditure  switching  and  supply13
enhancing  will  be basically  futile.
The  Money  Overhang  problem
Let  us assume  now  that  the  microeconomic  and  institutional  reforms  at the
level  of the  firm  take  place  and  that  markets  start  to  play  a dominant  role  in
economic  decisions  so that realignment  in relative  prices  does indeed  make
sense. The  next  question  is  what  problems  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  does  the
money  overhang  pose (in  SE economies  in  which  price  increases  have  not already
eliminated  it)  and  what can  be done  to  counteract  it.
The  notion  of money  overhang  needs  to  be defined  more  precisely.  Here  we
will  distinguish  the  flow  and  stock  dimension  of it.  The  flow  of  money  overhang
refers  to the  rate  at  which  the  public  is  holding  money  balances per  period  of
time,  say  AM.  This increase  in the  stock  of money  is in turn  reflection  of an
excess  of intended  expenditure,  PE,  over  actual  purchases,  PY.  Then
AM  - PE -PY
The  stock  of  money  overhang  is,  in  turn,  the  accumulation  of the  stock  of
real  balances  over  time,  say  the  integral  of  A  M/P.
There  are  several  ways the  money  overhang  (as  an  excessive  stock  of real
balances)  could  be eliminateds
a)  Monetary  reform.
b) Allowing  prices  to  jump so  to clear  the  goods  market.
c) Portfolio  diversification.
Monetary  Reform.  A  monetary  reform,  of the type implemented  in West Germany
after  World  War II,  specifically  in  1948 ,  amounts  to a reduction  in  the  stock
of nominal  balances  in order  to  restore  equilibrium  in  the  money  market  at the14
existing  price  level.  In  the  case  of  Germany  1948,  the  monetary  reform  amounted
to a reduction  close  to  90 percent  of the  stock  of  money  existing  at the  tilde
of the  monetary  reform  (see  Wallich,  1954).  The  basic  measure  taken  during  the
currency  reform  was the  confiscation  of a large  proportion  of time  and  savings
deposits  held  by the  public  in  the  banking  system,  through  a  rate  of conversion
of 100  Reichsmark  to 6.5  new Deutsche  Mark.  The  political  feasibility  of such
a drastic  move is an obvious  draw back of the policy,  though  in principle,
monetary  illusion  aside, cutting  real balances  through  a cut in M  is not
different  from  doing  it through  a rise  in P.
Price  Deregulation Another  way to restore  balance  in the  money  market  is to
allow  controlled  prices  to jump (including  the  official  exchange  rate)  while
maintaining  the  same  level of  the money  supply.  In  practice  the  level of
uncontrolled  prices  - particularly  the  free  market  price  of the  dollar-  already
reflects a  price adjustment to  monetary imbalances.  Moreover, allowing
controlled  prices  to jump ,  would  produce  a drop  in the  free  market  quotation
of the  dollar.
On the  other  hand  it  is  worth  recognizing  that  a  sudden  jump  in  the  price
level  (also  the  monetary  reform)  may  entail  a  large  drop  in  real  wages  and  a  cut
in domestic  demand.  That  may  be the  necessary  cost  of  correcting  macroeconomic
imbalances,  but  it is important  to  be aware  of the  associated  costs.
Portfolio  Diversification.  A third  avenue  to reduce  the  money overhang  is by
introducing  other assets  in the system  in order to allow  wealth  holders  to
diversify  their  portfolios  away  from  highly  liquid  assets. The  creation  of a
domestic  capital  market  would  be functional  in  that  regard  and several  actions
could  be devised. Among  them,  the  selling-off  of shares  of public  enterprises
to the  public,  the  issuance  of government  bonds,  the  auctioning  of state-owned15
housing  and the creation  of foreign  currency  linked  financial  instruments  by
domestic  banks.  In  these  cases  sterilization  of the  proceeds  of  the  auctions  of
public  assets  is required.
All these  measures  will  be short  lived  if  some  structural  corrections  are
not  made  in  order  to  avoid  a resurgence  of  the  money  overhang  problem. The  most
obvious  way  money  is  being  pumped  into  the  economy  is  through  the  monetization
of  fiscal (and quasi-fiscal)  deficits.  To  avoid this problem, public
enterprises  must  be  moved  from  a  practice  of soft  budget  constraints  to that  of
the 'hard'  budget  constraints.  The system  of  widespread  price  controls  set  at
excess  demand  levels,  the tendency  to generate  excess  demand  for  goods  as a
consequence  of an excessive  investment  drive,  the practice  of guaranteeing  0
full employment  at a  level of real wages inconsistent  with the marginal
productivity  of labor,  and  the  system  of financial  repression  that  leaves  money
as the basic  asset for accumulation  are all "structural*  factors  behind  the
money  overhang  problem.
Financial  deepeninp  in a reforming  economy
Financial  deepening  e.g.,  an increase  in the  menu of assets  available  to
wealth holders, can be oriented  tn eliminate  the money overhr.ng.  Standard
arguments  in favor  of financial  deepening  in a market  econowy  refer  to its
potentially  beneficial  effects  on the'efficiency  of  investment  achieved  through
'deepen'  financial  intermediation  (some  also argue tha'c  it would bring an
increase  in  savings).  In  the  context  of  the  transition  from  a  centrally  planned
to  a  market  or  mixed  economy,  financial  deepening  goes  beyond  a .impLe  increase
in the  menu of assets  available  for  wealth  holders  and/or  the  alim.ination  of
certain regulations  of the financial  system.  It involves  the creation  of16
capital  markets,  a  crucial  step  in  the  way  to introduce  private  property  in  the
system  and  certainly  a  strong  departure  from  previous  dominant  orthodoxy  where
private  property  was severely  restricted  and  discouraged.  From  a macroeconomic
perspective  there are important  transitional  issues  involved  in financial
liberalization  that  are  worth  spelling  out.
First,  financial  reform  will  produce  a change  in the  property  structure
and  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  the  socialist  economy.  Distributional  shifts
are associated,  for  example,  with the  acquisition  by certain  segments  of the
population  of physical  assets  previously  held  by the  state. In societies  that
formerly  placed  strong  emphasis  in  equity  considerations,  the  public  perceptions
on  the  new  property  structure  that  will  arise  from  the  reform  process  is  an  open
question. On the  other  hand,  once  the  decision  to start  changing  the  property
structure  towards  private  property  has  been  made,  the  pace  at  which  to  proceed
with  privatization  and  (the  experiences  of  Chile  and  the  U.K.  in the  last  two
decades  suggest  that  privatization  is  a  slow  process)  whether  public  enterprises
should  be  made  profitable  before  selling  them  or  whether  privatization  of  public
firms should be  undertaken  quite independently  of  its current financial
situation  must be addressed.
Second,  the  impact  of interest  rate  deregulation  on savings,  is  a  priori,
ambiguous  since  the interest  elasticity  of savings  can  be either  positive  or
negative  as  wealth  and  substitution  effects  usually  go in opposite  directions.
Empirical  evidence  on  interest  elasticity  of  saving  for  non-socialist  economies
have found  low  positive  values  for  that  parameter.
Third,  the firm  sector  holding  outstanding  debt  with  the  banking  system
at  negative  real  interest  rates,  will  experience  an adverse  financial  shock  as
finncial reform  involving  interest  rate  deregulation  is  implemented.  Moreover,17
if the  public  sector  bails  out some  of those  indebted  firms,  there  will be a
negative financial  transfer  from the point of view of the public sector
associated  with the financial  reform.  Even though  the  practice  of  bailing  out
unprofitable  productive  (or  financial)  units  departs  from  the  spirit  of  a  market
economy,  externality  arguments  and  costs  of adjustment  considerations  may lead
a reformist  government  to follow  this  course  of action.
Fourth,  a  positive  pricing  of  public  sector  lending  will  have  a favorable
budgetary  effect  since subsidized  credit  constitutes  an important  source  of
fiscal  deficits  (including  the  Central  Bank)  in socialist  economies.
Fifth,  the issuance  of dollar  denominated  (or  dollar-indexed)  domestic
assets may  help to prevent capital flight  by  creating  a  domestic asset
denominated  in  foreign  currency  that  can  be  acquired  by  nationals.  Nonetheless,
the financial  and  fiscal effects of  real depreciation  when part of  the
liabilities  of the banking  system and/or  the government  is denominated  in
dollars  and  its  assets  are  in local  currency  is  a feature  not  to  be  disregarded
when examining  the  convenience  of introducing  such  assets.
Sixth,  financial  deepening  in a  highly  inflationary  situation  when the
economy  is  demonetized  amounts  to  se  inflationary  shock,  as  the  increase  in the
menu of assets  available  to wealth  holders  induces  a  rise in  money-velocity.
In order  for financial  de6pening  to make sense,  it  must be preceded  by fiscal
reform  thus  avoiding  a conflict  between  financial  reform  and stabilization.
3.  Inflation  in  Socialist  Economles
The problem  of open inflation  in socialist  economies  is a rather  new
phenomena,  though  the  pervasive  existence  of  excess  demand,  rationing  and  black
markets  for  goods  - symptoms  of  repressed  inflation-  is  an  old  story  in  those18
economies. In the  seventies,  with  the  exception  of Yugoslavia, there  was  no
serious  problem  of open inflation  in  most socialist  economies  (see  Table  1).
Nonetheless,  in the  eighties,  inflationary  pressures  become  more important  in
courtries  like  Poland,  Yugoslavia  and  Hungary.  In  particular  Yugoslavia  in  1989
was  in  hyperinflation  with  2,700  percent  inflation  and  Poland  exhibited  a  quasi-
hyperinflationary  rate of inflat!on  of around  700  percent  in 1989.  Clearly,
Poland and Yugoslavia  have already  joined  the club of very high inflation
countries.
Table  1  Inflation  in selected  socialist  economies
(average  annual  rate  of  change  In  the  consumer  price
index,  I  )
1970-76  1978-80  1981  1982  1988  1984  1986  1986  1987  1988  1989
Hungary  2.6  6.8  4.6  6.9  7.3  8.3  7.0  5.3  8.6  15.7  19.6
Poland  2.2  6.8  24.4  101.6  28.0  15.7  14.4  16.0  25.2  60.0 700.08/
YugoslavIa  17.7  18.8  89.8  81.5  40.2  54.7  72.2  89.8  120.8  194.1  2,700.0
East  Cermny  -0.8  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Soviet  Union  0.0  0.6  1.0  8.0  1.0  -1.0  1.0
Source:  H. Bleany  (1988)  and  World  Bank.
at  Estimated
This  table  suggests  that  there  is  considerable  cross  country variability
in inflation  rates  within the socialist  area.  On the one hand, reported
inflation  rates  in countries  like  East Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union  is almost
nil;  on the  other  hand,  Yugoslavia  in  the  last  couple  of decades  and  Poland  in
the eighties,  have experienced  inflation  rates  well above (East  and West)
European  standards. 4 It is interesting  to note that  socialist  countries  that
tried economic reform --  within a socialist framework --  in the eighties and
well before, as the case of Yugoslavia,  are the ones that exhibit more19
accentuated  inflationary  trends  within  the  socialist  area.
To deal  formally  with the  issue  of inflation  in  socialist  economies,  let
us obtain  first the price level,  P. that equilibrate  aggregate  demand  with
aggregate  supply  in  our  model  of Section  2.
(8)  P  - P (  M, EP*,  W, Z,  q,u)
This equation  shows that a discrete  devaluation,  a once and for all
increase  in the stock  of money  or a supply  shock,  will produce  a jump in the
price level.  Therefore  adjustment  of controlled  prices,  the elimination  of
subsidies  to consumer  goods  or an  exchange  rate  adjustment,  in the  wake of a
reform  package,  will  produce  just  temporary  inflation"  (as  measured  in  discrete
time intervals)  but it will not per se  produce  a sustained  inflationary
process.
The causes  behind  a sustained  process  of inflation  can  be understood  by
expressing  equation  (8)  in  terms  of  rates  of  growth.  Denoting  g8 as  the  rate  of
change  in the  variable  x,  say  gx  =  OxIx  and  the  rate  of inflation  by ir  we
have:
(9)  '-r  gm,  gw,  get  gp*.  9)
where  gm is  the  rate  of  growth  of the  money  supply,  g8  is  the  rate  of growth  of
nominal  wages, ge is the rate of devaluation,  gp* is the rate of foreign
inflation  and e  represents  random  shocks  in aggregate  supply  and aggregate
demand.
The model can be  extended to encompass  various stories about the
inflationary  process:20
Inflationary  Inertia
If there  is wage, exchange  rate  and monetary  indexation  mechanisms  in
place  geared  to  past  period  inflation  and  inflation  also  respond  to  expectations
re  then  the  rate  of inflation  may be  written  as a linear  combination  of r_ 1
and  re (see  Bruno  and  Fischer,  1987)
r  . a  v-1  +  (1-a)  re
If expectations  are  adaptative  this  equation  may  capture  the  dynamics  of
inflation  in an economy  with a relatively  long  experience  with inflation  and
strong  elements  of inertia  embedded  in.  This  specification,  in turn  can  be a
useful description  of what is likely  to be the dynamics  of inflation  in
socialist  economies  that  start  to put  in  place  indexation  mechanisms  as  way to
adapt  to inflation.
Fiscal  Deficits,  External  Shocks  and  Inflation
Equation  (9)  also can be linked  to the financing  of fiscal  deficits.
Assuming  that  a fraction  B of the  fiscal  deficit  ratio,  #, is  monetized,  then,
6MIM  =  gm  =  (monetization  share)  (fiscal  deficit/GDP)(velocity)  = B 0  V
This equation states  that the rate of money growth is a non-linear
function  of the  fiscal  deficit  and  the  income  velocity  of  money.  Plugging  this
relationship  in equation  (9),  the rate  of inflation  will  be a function  of the
share  of the fiscal  deficit  financed  through  money  creation  and  the velocity
parameter  (besides  of other  "cost  push"  variables):
7  =  IC  a,  0,  V,  gw  get  gp*  e  )21
The inclusion  of fiscal  deficits  in the inflation  equation,  besides
calling  attention  to the  fiscal  and  monetary  causes  of inflation,  provides  a
very  relevant  link  between  currency  devaluations,  external  shocks  and  inflation.
Some  of the  transmission  mechanisms  at  work in this  regard  are:
- a currency  devaluation  may increase  the fiscal  deficit  ratio  and
inflation  as  long  as  the  increase  in  the  domestic  currency  value  of
external  public debt outweighs  a  potential  increase  in foreign
sector  tax  revenues.
changes  in  the  financing  mix  of public  sector  deficits,
associated  with a  cut  off  in foreign  b'ov,zg  and  its  replacement
by credits  from the  central  bank  wil''  be inflationary.  In other
words  the  lack  of fiscal  adjustment  in face  of a (permanent)  cut
down in the  foreign  transfer  to the  public  sector  is an important
factor  behind  inflationary  acceleration.
the financing  of losses  of public  enterprises  out of the public
sector  budget  is inflationary.  The intertemporal  distribution  of
inflation associated to  the  financing of  losses of  public
enterprises  will depend  on  whether  those  losses  are financed  with
money creation  today  or tomorrow  when public  debt come due (e.g
Sargent-Wallace  unpleasant  monetarist  arithmetic).
Hyperinflation
A recent  trend  observed  in some socialist  economies  is the slide  into
hyperinflation,  the  most eloquents  case  of that  being  Yugoslavia  and  Poland  in
1989.  Some  of the  features  of hyperinflation  that  can  be captured  by the  model
are:22
- When the  tax  system  is  not  indexed,  at  high rates  of inflet';n  the
fiscal  deficit  tends  to worsen (the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect). In a
traditional  socialist economy this effect seems to  be  less
important,  however  in a reformed  system  with a new tax structure
this effect  may appear.  The ensuing  endogeneity  of the fiscal
deficit  with respect  to  the  inflation  rate  can  be  written  as
- (Xr)
- the assumption  of a constant  income  velocity  of money becomes
clearly  unrealistic  in  a highly  inflationary  situation. A better
specification  in that case is to make velocity  a  function  of
expected  inflation:
V - V  (re)
- another  well recognized  feature  of  a  hyperinflation  is  the  collapse
of the contract  structure.  Basically  any medium term contract
structure  disappears  and  the  exchange  rate  (usually  the  black  market
quotation)  becomes  the  de-facto  escalator  to  which  most  prices  and
even wages use as a  reference  for adjustment.  This can be
formalized  by assuming  that
gw  ge*
Plugging  those  functional  forms  for  #(e),  V(O) and  gw into  the
inflation  equation  we gett
r  - r  (B,  (  Cr),  V(we). ge. Sp*'  e)
Furthermore  assuming  that  re  r  ,  we get
f  - X  (get  *)
That equation  states  that a key determinant  of price increases  during
hyperinflation  is  the  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate5.  The  key  policy23
implication  here,  is  that  to  eliminate  hyperinflation  the  exchange  rate  has  to
be  stabilized.  Fiscal reform and adequate external financing  become the
cornerstone  of successful  stabilization.
Stabilization
From  the  viewpoint  of stabilization  in  inflationary  socialist  economies
these  simple  models  suggest  that  attacking  the  sources  of  money  growth  ,  namely
consolidated  fiscal  deficits  (including  the  quasi-fiscal  deficit  of the  Central
Bank),  is  a  basic  condition  for  assuring  low  and  stable  inflation  in  the  medium
run.  However,  the  transition  Crom  a  high  inflation  equilibria  to  a low  inflation
equilibria is often a  complicated  task as  the experience  with economic
stabilization  in  chronic  inflation  countries  shows.  The  existence  of indexation
mechanisms,  inertia  in  the  contracts  structure  and  credibility  problems  are  all
elements  that  tends  to  slow  the  disinflationary  process  in  spite  of  corrections
in fundamentals.  Whether  this  transitional  problems  could  be less  important  in
socialist  economies  with  a  shorter  inflationary  history  is  something  that  still
remains  to be seen.
The potential difficulties  in correcting  fiscal deficits atd the
abandonment  of accommodative  credit  policies,  should  not  be underestimated.  In
fact,  public  enterprises  in socialist  economies  have followed  for  decades  the
practice  of soft  budget  constraints  covering  losses-  many of them induced  by
distortive  pricing  imposed  on them  by the government  - with automatic  credit
lines  and  grants.  To  change  this,  new rules  for  the  public  sector  are  required
including  the strict  enforcement  of the budget constraints.  The costs of
changing  the rules  is undoubtly  a factor  that  will make stabilization  a hard
task.
Another  factor  that  may ease  the  cost  of stabilizing  and  contribute  to  a24
more rapid  disinflation  is  the  provision  of adequate  external  financing.  Such
financing  would  help support  the exchange  rate and  would avoid  part of the
"replacement  problem*  from  foreign  financing  to  the  inflation  tax  that  is  behind
the  acceleration  of inflation  in  several  highly  indebted  socialist  economies  in
the  eighties. Of course,  the last  solution  will be the  correction  of fiscal
imbalances  that  forced  governments  to  resort  to  the  inflation  tax  to  begin  with.
4.  The  Problem  of Growth
The  problem  of growth  in  socialist  economies  has  both  trerd  (secular)  and
cyclical  dimensions.  On the  one  hand,  it becomes  apparent  that  a  slowdown  in
the rate  of GDP growth  in several  SE represents  a downward  trend  that  can  be
traced  back to the mid-seventies  (see  table  2).  On the other  hand, in the
eighties  the slowdown  is  more pronounced  and  negative  growth  rates  have  been
observed  in sever6l  years. One  striking  feature  of this,  is that  the  slowdown
in growth  in  these  economies  has  coexisted  with  high  investment  rates,  at least
by  market  economies  standards  (see  table  3).25
Table  2  GDP In  selected  socialist  econoaies
(average  annual  growth  rates,  Z)
1960-65  1965-70  1970-75  1975-80  1980-85  1986  1987  1988
Hungary  4.3  3.1  3.4  2.3  0.9  1.5  3.4  0.1
Poland  4.1  3.8  6.6.  0.9  1.2  4.2  1.9  4.0
Yugoslavia  5 7a  5.2  1.0  3.4  -0.5  -1.0
East  Germany 2.9  3.2  3.5  2.4  1.7
Soviet  Unionb  5.0  2.2  1.8  3.9  0.5
Source:  M. Nuti (1988)  and  World  Bank.
a: 1971-75
b: the  periods  correspond  to 1966-70,  1976-80,  1981-85.
Table  3  Gross  investmant  ratios  in selected  socialist  economies
(share  of  GDP,  2)
1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986  1987  1988
Hungary  32.9  35.9  37.2  31.0  26.9  26.7  25.0
Poland  25.3  36.4  30.7  24.6  28.9  28.8  32.5
East  Germany  27.6  28.7  30.6  25.0
Soviet  Union  27.0  29.9  ;t0.3  29.8
______________
Source:  M. Nuti (1988)  and  World  Bank.
Examining  the causes  underlying  the slowdown  in growth in socialist
economies,  let us start with the supply  side.  The starting  point is an26
aggregate  production  function. Assuming  away  imported  intermediate  inputs,  it
can  be  written  as:
(10) Y - F (L,  K,  AJ
where  K denotes  the  capital  stock,  A is  a  parameter  representing  the  state
of technology  in the economy  and L, as before,  is the level  of employment.
Differentiating  (10)  we get:
(11)  gy  - 9F,L  n +  0 INIY  +  VF,A  gA
where gy is the rate of growth  of output,  n is the rate of growth  of
population,  IN/Y  is  the  ratio  of  net  investment  to  output  and  gA is  the  rate  of
technical  change. The  parameter F  (x - L,  A) is the  corresponding  factor-
output  elasticity  and  9 is the  marginal  productivity  of capital  (9  =  6F/5K).
The  empirical  observation  of low  growth  rates  (low  gy)  coexisting  along  with  a
high  rate  of (net)  investment  may  be due  to:
- low  productivity  of  capital  (a  low  0)
- a low  rate  of technological  change,  gA
- a slow  pace  of  population  growth.
- the  distortive  effect  of accounting  relative  prices  of
capital  different  from  their  scarcity  value  and reflected  in high
investment  shares.
The  exact  weight  of each  of these  factors  in explaining  the  trend  toward
slow  growth  in  socialist  economies  observed  since  the  mid-seventies  is  expected
to  vary from  country  to country.
However,  the general  picture  that emerges  from Table 4 concerning  the
productivity  of capital  is the following:  in most countries  of East Europe27
capital  productivity  increased  in  the  fifties  and  sixties  namely  in  their  first
phase  of adoption  of the socialist  model (in  the Soviet  Union  the period  of
faster  productivity  growth  was  in  the  thirties  --  specifically  between  1933  and
1937  --  where  manufacturing  output  per  man-hour  grew  at an  average  annual  rate
of 6.5  percent,  Bleaney,  1988).6
Nevertheless,  as  Table  4 shows,  the  initial  trend  of  productivity  growth
in  Eastern  Europe  started  to  be reversed  in  the  seventies  - in the  Soviet  Union
that  process  already  started  in  the  fifties  - with  the  rate  of  growth  of  capital
productivity  turning  very low  and  even  negative.
These  empirical  findings  are  a  bit  puzzling  in  terms  of a  source  of  growth
methodology  like equation  (11).  In fact, th,.y  may imply  negative  rate of
technical  progress  over time  (i.e.,  gA <  0 ) . On the other hand, if
technological  progress  were *embodied*,  namely  it  could  not  take  place  without
investment,  it remains  to be explained  how the  high investment  rates  observed
in socialist  economies  are  associated  with so low  or even  negativew  rates  of
productivity  growth. The  issue  clearly  requires  more  research  if  we want  to  get
a fuller explanation  of the  phenomena.28
Table  4  Capital  productivity  In  selected  socialist  econosies
(annual  average growth  rates  of  output  per  uit  of
capLtal, )
1950152-67/69  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986
Hungary  0.7  -2.9  -3.1  -3.1  -3.0
Poland  2.6  1.9  -5.5  -3.4  2.7
East  Germany  2.8  -0.4  -1.5  -0.4  0.5
Soviet  Union  -1.1  -2.8  -2.9  -1.8  -1.5
Source:  M.Bleaney  (1988)
Let  us take  a look  now  at the  problem  of growth  from  the  perspective  of
the  availability  of domestic  and  foreign  savings.  Two  issues  stand  as relevant
heret
- the elimination  of the money overhang  and the need to channel
domestic  savings  into  productive  investment.
- the  need  for  foreign  exchange  to  import  capital  goods  and  to  pay  for
foreign  technology  in  order  to  boost  growth.
These issues  can be dealt  with in a more systematic  way with three
equations  from  the  previous  model,  written  in  a slightly  modified  way.  Starting
with the investment  - savings  equality,  (normalized  by the level  of GDP),  or
goods  market  equilibrium  condition,  we haves
(12) SDjy  +  F/Y  - I/Y29
where  SDIY represents  the  domestic  savings  ratio,  F/Y  denotes  the  amount
of foreign  savings  as share  of output  and  I/Y  is  the  gross  investment  ratio.
The second  equation  is the  balance  of payments  (normalized  by the  level
of  output).  Now  the  current  account  depends  on  the  investment  ratio  (through  the
import  of capital  goods),  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  share  of interest  payments
abroad  and  the  other  arguments  expressed  in equation  (7)  s
(13)  B/Y  - ca (eR,  I/Y. TBnC/Y,  r*D*/Y)  + F/Y
where  ca denotes  the  current  account  deficit  as share  of  GDP.
The third  equation  is given  by (11). It links  GDP growth  with the  rate
of investment:
(14) gy  - O I/Y  +  h
where  h  - 9F,L  n + VF,A  8A  - O DEP/Y
and  DEP/Y  - replacement  investment  as share  of GDP
Figure  2 (a)  depicts  in (I/Y,  F/Y)  space  equations  (12)  and (13),  namely
the  investment  - savings  condition  and  the  balance  of  payments,  drawn  for  given
values of eR, TBnc, r*D*/Y and F/Y.  Figure 2  (b), in turn, shows the
relationship  between  the  rate  of  GDP  growth  and  the  investment  ratio  - equation
(14)-  draw for  a  given  hs30
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Furthermore,  let  us  assume  that  in  the  socialist  economy  the  investment
ratio  is  determined  by the  condition:
I/Y - min( (I/Y)B- (I/Y)S 
where  (I/Y)B  is  the  investment  ratio  consistent  with  the  'external  gap',  namely
its  satisfies  equation  (13).  The  ratio  (I/Y)S  satisfies  the  savings-investment
condition  or  'internal  gap'  given  by  equation  (12).  In  this  setting,  given  the31
real  exchange  rate,  the  rate  of investment  is  determined  by the  constraint  that
is  binding:  when the  limiting  resource  is  the  availability  of foreign  exchange
to  import  machinery  and  equipment  the  external  gap  is  binding  (more  relevant
this case for SE that produces  a narraw range of capital  goods at home).
Conversely,  when the lack of domestic  savings  is the binding  constraint  to
finance  domestic  capital  formation,  then  the  internal  gap  is limitative.
In  terms  of  Figure  2 (a),  the  external  gap  is  binding  for  an  availability
of foreign  savings  fo  <  fe.  Therefore (I/Y)  - (I/Y)B  - (IjY)o  and  g-(gy)O.
It is  interesting  to  notice  that  for  f  - fo  SD,y  > (lIY) 0 - FIY. Namely,
when the  external  gap is  dominant  there  is an excess  of domestic  savings  over
investment  (net  of foreign  savings)  that  is  not translated  into  higher  growth.
In a socialist  economy  this  excess  of domestic  savings  may take  the form  of a
money overhang  The banking system  will accumulate  deposits in domestic
currency  but  the  economy  is still  locked  in  a trap  of low  growth  because  of the
lack  of  foreign  exchange  to  import  capital  goods.  Now to  speed  up  growth  in
these  conditions?  In  terms  of  figure  2  (a),  a  real  depreciation  of  the  exchange
rate, a  reduction  in interest  payments  abroad or a  relaxation  of credit
constraints  in international  capital  markets  can  do the  job  by shifting  the  BB
schedule  upward  to the  left  to intersect  at  El
The case of a binding internal  gap corresponds  to ratlos  of forelgn
savings  to GDP larger  than  f*,  where  gD1y <  (I/y) 1 - PlY.  How to increase
domestic  savings  and  get  savings  mobilisations?  An increase  in  public  savings
(e.g.,  a reductlon  in the  fiscal  deficit)  and financial  reform  could  lncrease
domestic  savings  shLftLng  the  SS  locus  up  to  the  left  ln order  to  flnance  a
higher  rate  of  investment,  which,  for  points  to  the  right  of  fo,  is  limited  by
the  avaLlabillty  of domestic  savings.32
A  flexible-price  vereLon  of  the  problem  of  low  growth  is  displayed  in
Figure  3 by  replacing  in  the  horizontal  axis  F by  eR --  the  real  exchange  rate.
Figure  3  is  dravn  by  assuming  that total  savings  fall  when the real  exchange
rate is depreciated.  This could  be rationalized  by noting that the current
account  deficit  is  expected  to fall  vith depreciation,  therefore,  reducing  the
contribution  of foreign  savings  to total  savings. In addition,  public  sector
saving  may fall  with a real  devaluation  if  the  increase  in  the real  domestic
currency  value of foreign  debt interest  payments  dominates  a  potentially
positive  effect  of increased  revenues  from  trade  taxes.  In this  case,  the  SS
schedule  slopes  downwards.
Figure  3.  Growth  under  price  flexibility
b)  I/Y  S  a)  B
gy  (8y)e  (gy)o  (eR)o  (eR)e  eR
At  a  real  exchange  rate  CCR)0  ,  the  lack  of  foreign  exctange  constraints
growth  below  (gy),e  Moreover,  at  (eR) O there  is  an  excess  of  total  savings  over
investment  (ex-ante)  or,  in  other  words,  an  excess  supply  develops  in  the  goods
markets.  In the  contezt  of price  flexibility  the  excess  supply  in the goods
market induce  a depreciation  of the real exchange  rate through  deflation  of33
domestic  prices(  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is assumed  to  be predetermined  and
foreign  prices  are  given). In turn,  the  deflation-induced  increase  in  external
competitiveness  improves  net exports  generating  more foreign  exchange  needed
to increase  the  imports  of capital  goods  and  speed  up growth.  In addition,  the
real  depreciation  will  reduce  total  savings  eliminating  the  excess  supply  in  the
goods  market thereby  restoring  internal  and external  balance at E1. What
adjustment  mechanism  is  a  better  description  for  a  socialist  economy?  Certainly
the  fix-price  setting  with low  substitutability  between  domestic  and imported
capital  goods  that  underlies  the  two  gap  model  fits  better  the  actual  working
of  a  centrally planned economy than  a  flexible-price,  mobile  capital
alternative.
However,  the  flexible-price  description  has  more  chances  of  being  observed
in  a reformed  socialist  economy  where  the  market  mechanism  is  expected  to play
a greater  role  in allocative  decisions. Nevertheless,  caution  is required  at
this  point  since  nominal  wage  and  price  rigidities  are  also  a  well  known  feature
of the  actual  working  of a market  economy  (incidentally,  in the  latter,  those
rigidities  are singled  out  by macroeconomic  theory  as an important  underlying
factor  in  producing  macroeconomic  fluctuations).
Until now the discussion  of growth in socialist  economies  has been
conducted  either  by  looking  at  the  sources  of  growth  (a  supply  side  view)  or  the
domestic  and  foreign  savings  availability  (a  savings  gap  view). Let  us  now  take
a look  at the  willingness  to invest  as a key factor  that  may impinge  upon  or
speed  up growth. The  basic  argument  here  is  that  nothing  guarantee  per-se  that
in an economy  where  savings  are  available  that  they  will be invested  at home.
In  other  words  a 'confidence  gap',  that  precludes  an  increase  in  investment,  may
be the  limiting  factor  for  a resumption  of investment  and  growth.34
A  'confidence  gapo tends  to appear  whenever  there  is a combination  of
uncertainty  regarding the  structure of  incentives  and/or the  degree of
macroeconomic  stability  (or  whatever  other  factor  is  deemed  to  be considered  as
important  by investors)  and  the  fact  that  capital  accumulation  is,  to a great
extent  an  irreversible  process.  This  irreversibility  feature  means  that  once  an
investment  decision  is  made it  can  not  be  undone  or 'reversed'  unless  you  incur
a sizeable  cost.  The  basic  implications  of the  irreversibility  argument  aret
i)  investment  will  be particularly  sensitive  to risk  factors;  ii)  the  value  of
waiting  increases  substantially  with  an  increase  in  uncertainty;  and  iii)  a  slow
take off of investment  is likely  to be observed  under  unstable  macroeconomic
conditions.
In the  case of socialist  economies  undergoing  a process  of reform  two
difficulties  for a vigorous  resumption  of private  investment  appear  as very
relevant.  First.  a  great  deal  of  systemic  uncertainty  is  present:  the  final  fate
of the  reforms  is  still  an  open  question  and  the  possibility  of  policy  reversals
should  not  be dismissed.  Moreover,  in several  SE  initiating  a reform  process,
there  are  serious  initial  macroeconomic  imbalances  so  that  the  permanence  of a
new  incentives  structure  hinges upon the successful  stabilization  of the
economy.  Second,  in a traditional  SE the  private  sector  is limited  to small
segments  in  the  service  and  agricultural  sectors;  therefore,  for  most  practical
purposes,  a  class  of  entrepreneurial  investors,  able  to  commit  resources  quickly
and  effectively  in  response  to  a  new  set  of  incentives,  is  virtually  inexistent.
Therefore,  the  creation  of  a  sector  of "Schumpeterian  entrepreneurs"  that  invest
and innovate  may  be a slow  process  that  could  delay  the  investment  response  to
the  reforms  with an obvious  cost in  terms  of foregone  growth. Although  it is
important to ensure an adequate availability  of savings to  finance the35
investment  effort  and  to  enhance  efficiency  on the  supply  side,  only  when  there
is  a supportive  macroeconomic  environment  can  private  investment  be encouraged
if  the  resulting  in  a reform  process  that  leads  to growth. On the  other  hand,
the very fate of the reform  attempt  will depend  on whether growth can be
achieved  and  sustained.
5.  Final  Remarks
This paper  seeks to provide  a simple  framework  suitable  for examining
questions  of macro  adjustment,  stabilization  and  economic  growth  in reforming
socialist  economies.  Excess  demand  in the  goods  market,  employment  redundancy,
money  overhang  and  forced  savings  are  some  of  the  key  macro  imbalances  in  a  pre-
reform,  centrally  planned  economy.  Realignments  in  key  relative  prices  like  real
wages,  the  real  exchange  rate  and  corrective  demand  policies  are  required  steps
to produce  macro  equilibrium  in socialist  economies  entering  into  a process  of
reform.
For  those  policies  to  become  effective  tools  of macroeconomic  management
some  basic  changes  in the  rules  of behavior  of firms,  the government  and  the
structure  of markets  are  required. The  establishment  of competitive  markets,
the abandonment  of accomodative credit  policies  to the public enterprise
sector, a  change in  the  objective function of  the  firm toward profit
maximization  or cost minimization  and the enforceability  of  'hard'  budget
constraints  are  key  policy  measures  in  that  direction.
The  problem  of  money  overhang,  in its  flow  dimension,  refers  to the  rate
of acquisition  of monetary  balances  by the  public  associated  to the  excess  of
intended  expenditure  over  actual  purchases.  The  (stock  of)  money  overhang  could
be  eliminated  and  equilibrium  in  the  money  market  restored  throught  i)  currency36
reform  aimed  at reducing  the  stock  of  nominal  money  balances  so  to  restore  money
market equilibrium  at the current price level; ii) the deregulation  of
controlled  prices  in  order  to  achieve  money  market  equilibrium  at the  existing
level  of the money supply;  the elimination  of excess  real balances  will be
carried  out  by the  jump  in  the  price  level;  and  iii)  the  selling  off  of certain
assets  of the public  sector  in order to alter  portfolio  composition  of the
public away from money.
A medium-term  solution  to avoid  the reappearance  of the  money overhang
requires  fiscal  reform  in order  to eliminate  the sources  of excessive  money
creation.  Another  steps  in that  direction  are the abandonment  of a system  of
widespread  price controls  at excess demand levels, the correction  of the
excessive  investment  drive  that  characterize  traditional  socialist  economies,
the misalignment  of real  wages with respect  te labor productivity,  and an
increase  in  the  menu  of  physical  and  financial  assets  available  to  the private
sector.
The  acceleration  of  inflation  in  several  socialist  economies  since  the  mid
eighties-  some  of them like  Yugoslavia  and  Poland  in  hyperinflation  in 1989  -
is also another  major macro problem for successful  reform.  The cut-off in
foreign  lending  to public sectors  that did not adjust  afterwards,  currency
devaluation, increased losses  of  state-owned public  enterprises and
accommodative  credit  policies  seem  to have been major  factors  underlying  the
recent  acceleration  of inflation  in several  socialist  economies.  The standard
prescription  of correction  in fundamentals-  namely fiscal deficits-  as a
requisite  for  low  and stable  inflation  in the  medium  run  is also relevant  for
reforming  SE.  However  the  transition  from  a  high  inflation  equilibrium  to  a low
inflation  equilibrium  may  be a  complicated  task.  In  chronic  inflation  countries37
(also in  other countries)  inertial elements in  the contract structure,
indexation  mechanisms  and  credibility  problems  pose  serious  problems  for  quick
disinflation  in spite  of corrections  in fundamentals.  The fact  that  inflation
is a relatively  new  phenomenon  in 2everal  SE,  might  make stabilization  easier
in  these  economies  than  in  chronic  inflation  country,  though  this  still  remain
to be  seen.  On the other hand, the elimination  of fiscal deficits  and
accommodative  credit  policies  may  be  a  complicated  process  in  economies  that  are
accustomed  to ouch  practices  for  a long  period  of time.
'the  problem  of  growth  is  another  important  issue  concerning  the  transition
from a  centrally planned economy to a  market oriented one.  A  growth
decomposition  exercise  shows  that  the  record  of  low  GDP  growth coexisting  with
high rates  of capital  accumulation  --  a trend  observed  in several "mature'
socialist  economies  --  is  consistent  with  a low  level  of  technical  progress  and
a rather  slow  pace  of population  gruwth. Empirical  evidence  on the  evolution
of capital  productivity  in socialist  economies  confirms  the  contribution  of a
low  pace  of  technical  progress  to  the  slowdown  in  secular  growth.  On  the  savings
side,  since  the debt crises  the lack of foreign  savings  --  needed  to  import
capital  goods  and  modern  technology  --  seems  to be an important  constraint  to
growth  in  several  socialist  economies. On the  other  hand,  the  mobilization  of
excess  domestic  savings  away from 'liquidw  assets  into physical  productive
assets  becomes  another  policy  priority  to speed  up growth. A  third  potential
constraint  to  growth  refers  to  the  reduced  'willingness  to  invest'  in  economies
with considerable systemic  uncertainty  as is the  case  of socialist  economies
undergoing  a  process  of reform  whose  final  fate  is still  uncertain. The  value
of  waiting  tends  to  increase  under  these  circumstances  leading  to  a  postponement
of investment  and  growth. An additional  complication  for  a take-off  of  private38
investment  in  reforming  socialist  economies  is  the  lack  of  a sizeable  sector  of
domestic private investors  with  experience  and  skills to capture newly
profitable  investment  opportunities.  The  formation  of  such  a  group  is  certainly
a pending  issue  in  the  resumption  of growth  in reforming  socialist  economies.39
REFERENCES
Balassa,  B. (1989),  'Perestroyka  and  Its  Implications  for  Eastern  Europe.' The
World  Bank  Conference  Paper.
Benassay,  J.P. (1982),  The  Economics  of  Market  Disequilibrium.
Dornbusch,  R. and  J.C.  De Pablo  (1988),  'The  process  of  high  inflation'  mimeo.
Bleaney,  M.F. (1988),  Do Socialist  Economies  Work?.  The Soviet and East
European  Experience.  Basil  Blackwell.
Bruno,  M. and S. Fischer (1986),  'The inflationary  process:  inflation  and
accommodation,"  in Y. Ben-Porat  (ed.)  The Israeli  Economy,  Maturing
through  Crises. Harvard  University  Press.
Gardner,  R. and  J. Strauss  (1981),  "Repressed  Inflation  in the  Soviet  Union.  A
temporary  Equilibrium  analysis,'  EuroPean  Economic  Review,  16.
Goldfeld,  S. and  R.Quandt  (1988),  'Budget  Constraints,  Bailouts  and the firm
under  Central  Planning'  Journal  of Comparative  Economics  12.  Academic
Press.
Hinds,  H.  (1989),  Issues in the Introduction  of Market Forces in Eastern
European  Socialist  Economies,  mimeo. The  World  Bank.
J. Kornai  (1980),  Economics  of Shortage,  Vol.  I and  II.  North-Holland.
-------  (1982),  Growth,  Shortage  and  Efficiency.  Oxford,  Blackwell.
-------  (1986),  'The  Hungarian  Reform  Process: Visions,  Hope  and  Reality.'
Journal  of Economic  Literature,  December.
Nuti, M.  (1988)  w  Perestroika:  Transition  from Central  Planning  to Market
Socialism'  in  Economic  Policy,  7.
-------  (1989),  'Remonetization  and  Capital  Markets  in  Eastern  Europe,  ' European
Economic  Review,  33.
R. Portes  (1986),  'The  Theory  and  Measurement  of Macroeconomic  Disequilibrium
in  Centrally  Planned  Economies,'  N.B.E.R.  Working  Paper  t1875.
-------  an"  D. Winter  (1980),  'Disequilibrium  Estimates  for  Consumption  Goods
Markets  in Centrally  Planned  Economies'  Review  of Economic  Studies,
49.
Solimano,  A.  (1989),  'Inflation  and the  Costs  of Stabilization:  Country
Experiences,  Conceptual  Issues  and  Policy  Issues,' PPR  Working  Paper
226.  The World Bank (also  forthcoming)  in The World Bank Research
Observer,  1990.40
- (1989)  '  How  private  Investment  reacts  to  changing  macroeconomic
conditions?  The case  of Chile  in  the  1980s. PPR Working  Paper  #  212.
Svejnar,J.  (1989),  'An  agenda  for  World  Bank  Research  on Socialist  Economies,"
mimeo.
Winiecki,  J. (1985),  'Inflation  under  Central  Planning:  Sources,  Processes  and
Manifestations'  in  Konjunkturpolitik,  Duncker  & Humbolt/Berlin.
soceconl.pap41
1. The counterpart  of paying  higher  real  wages  than the  marginal  productivity
of labor  vill be a loss  for  (public)  enterprises  hiring  labor  at that  level  of
real  wages.  This,  in turn,  will be  a cause  of fiscal  deficits.
2.  Another  element  that  explains  why  there  is  excess  demand  in  the  goods  market
(the  single  good  serves  for  consumption,  investment  and  export  purposes)  is the
excess  demand  for  investment  I  the  investment  hunger'  feature  that  is  generally
ascribed  to the  working  of  a socialist  system  (see  Kornai,  1982).
The forced  savings  hypothesis  is  not  the  only  one  for  explaining  the  high  savings
rate in SE. There is also a competing  view that the high savings  rate  just
reflect  private  sector  preferences  for  a  pattern  of consumption  more tilted  to
future  than  present  consumption  in  SE.  On  the  other  hand,  high  government  savings
in traditional  SE may be simply  reflecting  the high investment  drive  of the
planners.
3.  See Hinds (1989)  for a discussion  of the role of private property  in
reforming  SE.
4. Some care should  be taken when interpreting  this data since they may
underestimate  the  actual  rate  of inflation.  These  inflation  rates  are  the  ones
recorded  in the official  price  indexes  which do not consider  the free  market
prices  for  goods  traded  in parallel  or black  markets  where  many transactions
seems  to  take  place  in socialist  countries.
5. See  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1986),  Sachs  (1986),  Solimano  (1989).
6.  Some  argue  that  the  high  measured  capital  productivity  growth  in the  fifties
and  sixties  in  large  part  represent  an overestimation  in  the  rates  of growth  of
GDP  in these  countries.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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